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OPINION BELOW
The opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida are reported at Jardines v. Florida, 73 So. 
^ 3d 34 (Fla. 2011) {'"Jardines II”). The opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third
District, is reported at Florida v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) {"Jardines F).
JURISDICTION





In analyzing the threshold issue of whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the police 
behavior in question, the standard is to “examine the District Court's judgment that the police 
seized [the defendant] under a de novo standard of review, as firmly entrenched doctrine in this 
court and the Supreme Court requires.” United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415,417 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). Only after the initial question of applicability has been answered does the Court analyze 
whether the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement has been satisfied. “[Ajs a 
general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de 
novo on appeal.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,699 (1996). However, the Ornelas 
Court urged reviewing courts to proceed cautiously: “We hasten to point out that a reviewing 
court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give 
due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement 
officers.” Id, at 699. Applying a de novo standard of review reduces law enforcement s 
incentive to obtain a warrant, whereas a deferential standard reinforces the preferred behavior of 
warrant seeking. Id. “We think reaffirmation of this standard better serves the purpose of 
encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983). 
Thus, unless this Court finds that the trial court was clearly erroneous in assessing the 
reasonableness of the warrants, its standard is to limit its discretionary use of de novo review and 
defer as much as possible to the trial court’s findings of fact and inferences.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Facts
On the morning of December 5,2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade 
Police Department surveyed a residential building at 13005 SW 257 Terrace in Miami-Dade
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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County, Florida. (J.A. 3, 8.) Detective Pedraja went to the building to investigate a tip that 
Crime Stoppers had received on November 3, 2006, that the building was being used for the 
illegal cultivation of marijuana. (J.A. 8.)
Detective Pedraja had vast experience and training in narcotics. (J.A. 131.) He had 
worked on hydroponic laboratory cases for approximately four years prior to the trial in this case. 
(J.A. 37.) He was trained by the Southeast Florida Institute of Criminal Justice to identify 
narcotics and he attended narcotics identification schools through the Miami-Dade Police 
Department Training Bureau. (J.A. 5.) Detective Pedraja also had practical experience in 
narcotics identification from having participated in many narcotic search and seizure actions, 
marijuana hydroponics laboratory investigations, and observations of marijuana grown via 
traditional and hydroponic methods. (J.A. 5.)
That morning, two other experienced, well-trained detectives assisted Detective Pedraja: 
Detective Doug Bartelt, who is a narcotics canine handler, and K.-9 drug detection dog Franky. 
(J.A. 9-13.) Franky is trained to detect the odor of marijuana and several other types of 
narcotics. (J.A. 13.) He has been involved in over 650 actions to detect narcotics and has given 
a positive alert 399 times. (J.A. 13.) Franky and the canine handler, Detective Bartelt, together 
complete weekly maintenance trainings. (J.A. 13.) Part of the weekly training includes negative 
testing and distracter training to ensure that Franky does not alert to anything other than the 
contraband substances he is trained to detect. (J.A. 13.) Detective Bartelt worked on the 
Narcotic Bureau of the Miami-Dade Police Department for six years prior to the search in 
question. (J.A. 10.) He has completed multiple Canine Narcotics Detection Courses and is 
certified as a canine handler. (J.A. 9-12.)
^ Dclcclive Pedraja observed the property for approximately fifteen minutes on the
morning in question. (J.A. 32.) Then Detective Bartelt approached the front door of the building 
with Franky in the lead and Detective Pedraja behind. (J.A. 35.) Franky gave a positive alert to 
^ the presence of marijuana, which is one of the contraband narcotics he is trained to detect. (J.A.
50-53.) When Detective Pedraja walked up closer to the front door, he smelled live marijuana 
plants. (J.A. 36.) Detective Bartelt and Franky then returned to their vehicle; they were on the 
premises a total of only five to ten minutes. (J.A. 54.)
Detective Pedraja knocked at the door but received no answer. (J.A. 37.) He walked into 
the front yard and heard an air conditioning unit mnning without cycling off. (J.A. 37.) This 
observation suggested that the home was a marijuana grow house, which uses heavy air 
conditioning to cool heat produced by high intensity light bulbs necessary for growing marijuana 
m indoors. (J.A. 38.)
After about fifteen to twenty minutes, Detective Pedraja went back to the threshold of the 
front door. (J.A. 37.) He observed that the window shades were drawn and that there were no 
^ cars in the driveway. (J.A. 109.) The property was not fenced. (J.A. 76.) The area around the
building was completely open, and there was a large sidewalk-driveway combination leading to 
the front door. (J.A. 49, 76.) After observing the property as described, Detective Pedraja left
m
the premises to prepare a request for a search warrant, as he had done in similar situations in the 
past. (J.A. 38, 132.) The search warrant was granted later that day on the basis that the detective 
had probable cause that the premises contained a controlled substance. (J.A. 3, 15.) When
r
Detective Pedraja returned to the building with the search warrant, he found more than twenty- 
five pounds of marijuana and a hydroponics laboratory for cultivating marijuana. (J.A. 112.)
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The police also found Respondent Joelis Jardines on Ihe premises and arrested him for 
trafficking marijuana. (J.A. 112.)
Procedural History
On June 8, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his house 
in the district court. (J.A. 1.) The trial court granted Respondent’s motion to suppress on June 
13, 2007, stating that the use of a drug detector dog constituted an unreasonable search, and that 
officers did not have sufficient probable cause to search Respondent’s house. (J.A. 16, 134.) 
The State of Florida appealed, and the District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded on 
October 22, 2008, holding that the canine sniff was not a search, and that the warrant granted 
after the canine sniff was based on sufficient probable cause. Jardines /, 9 So. 3d at 10. 
Respondent appealed, and on April 14, 2011, the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the District 
Court of Appeal’s decision. Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 34.
The Supreme Court of Florida reasoned that the canine sniff was an unreasonable 
intrusion into the protected area of the home. Jardines //, 73 So. 3d at 56. The court held the 
canine sniff to be a search because a canine reveals more than the presence of contraband, the 
public spectacle involved in such a police action is embarrassing, and the sanctity of the home 
warrants heightened safeguards. Id. at 49. The court also held that the appropriate evidentiary 
standard to apply is reasonable suspicion, believing that this Court’s precedence precludes a 
canine sniff from falling within the minimally intmsive exception to general rule of probable 
cause. Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 53. The State of Florida appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
United States on October 26, 2011, and certiorari was granted on January 6, 2012. (J.A. 1.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of Florida erred in treating a canine sniff as a search subject to a 
probable cause evidentiary standard and its judgment should be reversed.
This Court has previously decided that canine sniffs for illegal narcotics are not searches 
subject to Fourth Amendment analysis. Such investigations do not violate the Katz v. United 
States test that hinges upon whether an investigation violates a person’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy since canine sniffs alert only to the presence of illegal material. A person has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy tor contraband, and the sniff reveals nothing about an 
individual’s legal activities. The canine sniff outside Respondent’s house was conducted from a 
publicly-accessible path on which the officer was legally present and, like other canine sniffs, it 
alerted only to the presence of contraband, telling the officer nothing about Respondent’s legal 
activities. Because this cursory inspection did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy or 
any property right, it does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
Alternatively if this Court concludes that the canine sniff on Respondent’s property was a 
search, reasonable suspicion is the appropriate evidentiary standard a court should use to assess 
the sniff s legality. Beginning with Terry v. Ohio and New Jersey v. T.L. O, this Court has carved 
out situations in which it applies a standard lower than probable cause to minimally invasive 
investigations where public interests outweigh the privacy interests intruded upon. Such cases 
are judged by a standard of reasonable suspicion rather than the probable cause standard to 
which full-scale searches are held. Canine sniffs fall within this zone of reasonable suspicion 
that the Court has already recognized because of their minimally intrusive nature. Accordingly, 
the canine sniff in question would be best analyzed under the reasonable suspicion standard, 
which the particular facts of this case are sufficient to satisfy.
Petitioner requests that this Court reverse the Supreme Court of Florida and remand the 
case with direction that this canine sniff does not qualify as a search under the Fourth 
Amendment or, in the alternative that it is a search, that its legality be assessed under the 
reasonable suspicion standard.
ARGUMENT
I. CANINE SNIFFS ARE NOT SEARCHES ACCORDING TO THIS AND OTHER 
COURTS, AND NEITHER IS THE CANINE SNIFF IN THIS CASE.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizure ...U.S. Const, amend. IV. This Court has defined the Fourth Amendment
through the Katz test and, more recently, through the Jones test. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347(1967); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). The TCfl/z test requires a two-part
inquiry to determine if a challenged police action constitutes a search: “first, has the individual
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is
society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 211 (1986). This is understood as the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. In Jones,
this Court recently reintroduced trespass of property to supplement the reasonable expectation of
privacy test to determine whether a government action constituted a search. 132 S. Ct. at 949.
This Court has already applied the Katz test to several cases involving canine sniffs and has held
generally that a police canine sniffing for illegal narcotics does not intrude on an individual’s
expectation of privacy and thus is not a search. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698
(1983); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
#
m A. This Court Has Held that Canine Sniffs Arc Not Searches in a Variety of Settings.
and the Same Standard Should Apply Here to tiie Cuitilage of the Home.
This Court has reviewed cases on canine sniffs in public places, such as airports, and at 
highway stops. Place, 462 U.S. at 698; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40. In every instance, this Court 
has held that a canine sniff is not a search. Place, 462 U.S. at 698; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
Here, although the canine sniff was on the front porch of defendant’s home, this area of the home 
was still open to the public. (J.A. 35.) The holdings of Place and Edmond should apply because, 
although additional protection is granted to the home, no additional protection is granted to the 
public areas around the home. See generally Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
1. Canine sniffs in airports are not searches because they only reveal
information about the presence of narcotics in luggage and do not reveal 
personal information about the luggage contents.
In Place, this Court held that a canine sniff in an airport for narcotics is not a search 
under the Fourth Amendment because the canine did not expose noncontraband items. 462 U.S. 
at 698. There, defendant was suspected of carrying narcotics in his luggage on the basis of his 
behavior while travelling in the airport. Id. at 699. The defendant’s luggage was detained and a 
police canine alerted to narcotics. Id. Police ultimately discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine in his 
luggage. Id. This Court held that the police could conduct the canine sniff without a warrant 
because the sniff “[did] not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden 
from public view,” and only gave authorities limited information of whether contraband was 
present. Id. at 707. This analysis suggests that there was no invasion of privacy in Place, since 
no personal items were exposed. Because canine sniffs reveal limited information about the 
presence of narcotics, the Court deemed it “sui generis ” and affirmed that there was “no other 
investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained 







invaded the defendant's privacy, nor could it be presumed to constitute a trespass on his personal 
property since the facts indicate that his luggage was never opened and the contents were not 
investigated or displayed before a warrant was obtained. Place, 462 U.S. at 707
Here, Officer Franky’s sniff did not publicly reveal any personal information about 
Respondent. (J.A. 36-37.) The sniff merely confirmed the authorities’ suspicion of 
Respondent’s marijuana grow house before they obtained a warrant to enter Respondent’s house. 
(J.A. 15, 50-53.) The officers on the scene did not open a window or seize any property by 
performing the canine sniff. (J.A. 50-53.) The canine simply entered the public throughway in 
front of Respondent’s house, spent five minutes sniffing the front door premises, and exited after 
alerting his handler to narcotics. (J.A. 54.) Detective Pedraja then knocked on Respondent’s 
front door and shortly left after no response. (J.A. 37.) In this process, none of Respondent’s 
personal items were viewed, exposed to the public, or detected. {See generally J.A. 37, 50-53, 
54.) Here, the canine sniff was limited in the manner and content of information it revealed, did 
not invade privacy or constitute a trespass, and thus was not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.
2. Canine sniffs at highway stops are not searches because the canine does 
not intrude on the privacy of the driver when detecting illicit drugs.
A canine sniff at a lawful traffic stop is not a search under the Fourth Amendment
because the canine only walks around the outside of the car and does not reveal to the police or
the public any personal information beyond the presence of narcotics. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32,
35. In Edmond, police used trained canines to detect illegal narcotics at vehicle checkpoints
around the City of Indianapolis. Id at 35. The narcotics detection dogs walked around the
outside of stopped vehicles and alerted officials to the presence of drugs. Id. This Court
reaffirmed its earlier position in Place that “an exterior sniff of an automobile does not require
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entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or 
absence of narcotics.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40. The canine did not violate the privacy of the 
vehicle’s owner by sniffing the outside, and did not reveal any information about the car other 
than whether it contained narcotics. Id. Similarly, it can be inferred that Edmond does not 
violate the Jones standard since the canine sniff did not constitute a trespass on the vehicle. See 
id. at 40; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945. Here, Franky walked around the public throughway of the 
house and alerted the police to drugs. (J.A. 35.) His sniff on the exterior of the house did not 
require entry into the house and only disclosed whether narcotics were present. (J.A. 35.) 
Therefore, like the sniff in Edmond, Franky’s sniff did not reveal any information about the 
inside of Respondent’s house beyond whether it contained narcotics, and thus no search 
occurred.
3. This Court should follow circuit court decisions, which have 
overwhelmingly held that canine sniffs are not searches.
In United States v. Brock. 417 F.3d 692, 693 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit held that 
a canine sniff for narcotics outside of the defendant’s locked door did not constitute a search.
The police entered the defendant’s apartment by invitation of his roommate and were notified 
that the defendant had large quantities of contraband items in his room. Id. at 693. The police 
brought Yoba, a trained canine, to the common area and Yoba gave a positive alert to narcotics 
in front of the defendant’s door. Id. at 693, 694. The court reasoned that the officers were 
lawfully present in the common area of the apartment, the canine sniff only detected the presence 
of contraband, and that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.
Id. The court distinguished these facts from a thermal imager in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27,32 (2001), because the canine sniff did not reveal information about the defendant’s home
beyond the presence of narcotics. Brock, 417 F.3d at 696. The facts in the present case are 
identical, and thus the same logic should apply.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision was consistent with the decisions from Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. See generally United States v. Vasqnez, 909 F.2d 235, 238 
(7fh Cir. 1990) (holding that a canine sniff in a public alley of a private garage was not a 
warrantless search); United States v. Reed. 141 F. 3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that a 
canine sniff was not a search when canine team was lawfully present inside a home); United 
States V. Reyes. 122 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a canine sniff outside a hotel 
room was not a search because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public 
hallway); United States v. Lingenfelter. 997 F.2d 632, 638 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a canine 
sniff of a commercial warehouse was not a search because defendant “could have no legitimate 
expectation that a narcotics canine would not detect the odor of marijuana”); United States v. 
Colyer. 878 F.2d 469,477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that a canine sniff of a sleeper car from 
train’s public corridor was not a search because it did not reveal items that would be hidden 
from view). But see United States v. Thomas, 151 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding 
that a canine sniff from hallway outside defendant’s apartment was a search because defendant 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy over the smells emanating from his apartment).
4. Because human officers can sniff premises without a warrant under the 
plain sniff doctrine, the same standard should apply to canine officers.
In Kyllo, this Court confirmed that eyes cannot be guilty of trespass, thus visual 
surveillance does not constitute a search. 533 U.S. at 32. In United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 
738, 747 (10th Cir. 2006), the court held that an officer’s use of smell was permissible as an 
extension of the plain view doctrine. Logically, if an object in plain view could be lawfully 
observed by police, then a smell clearly perceived outside of the home can also be lawfully
observed by the police. Angelos, 433 F.3cl at 747. The smell leaves the house for any member 
of the public to perceive, and thus a dog does not intrude on private space by perceiving that 
aroma. SeeJardines //, 73 So. 3d at 57 (Lewis, J. concurring); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F. 
3d 207, 214 (2nd Cir. 2006). The faculties granted to humans and animals alike to perceive the 
world around them cannot trespass on private property. See Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 57 (Lewis, 
J. concurring); Jenkins, 452 F. 3d at 214 A nose cannot be guilty of trespass any more than the 
eyes can be, as smells disseminating from a house are free and open to the public and cannot 
hold a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 57 (Lewis, J. concurring); 
Jenkins, 452 F. 3d at 214.
B. This Court Has Held that the Standard for Determinina Whether a Search
Occurred Is if the Defendant Had a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, and This 
Court Has Held that There Is No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in 
Contraband.
This Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy test was established in Katz and is 
comprised of two prongs to determine if a challenged police action constitutes a search: ‘‘first, 
has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged 
search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?” Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. at 211. In United States v. Jacobsen, this Court held that there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in contraband because the Fourth Amendment does not protect individuals committing 
a crime. 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). Here, although Respondent may have had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in his home to maintain his hydroponic marijuana grow house, his 





1. A subjective expectation of privacy is insufficient if that expectation is not 
reasonable, and here Respondent’s expectation of privacy in the smells 
emanating from his residence was not reasonable.
In its application of the Katz test, this Court has found that even if a defendant manifests 
a subjective expectation of privacy, an invasion on that expectation by police is not a search if 
the defendant’s expectation is not an expectation that society would recognize as reasonable. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207. In Ciraolo, officers suspected that the defendant was growing 
marijuana in his backyard but were unable to visually view the backyard from the street because 
the defendant had installed nine-foot tall fences surrounding his property. Id. The officers 
chartered a plane for the purpose of flying over the defendant’s property, and they visually 
identified marijuana plants in the backyard. Id. In applying Katz, this Court found that the 
defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy since he had installed fences high enough to 
block most views of his property. W. at 211-12. However, a telephone repairman or a passerby 
with the right angle could have seen over the high fence. Id. at 214. Although the defendant had 
a subjective expectation of privacy, this Court held that it was not a reasonable expectation since 
the backyard could be easily visible from the airspace. Id. The officers’ airplane was in 
navigable airspace, which is open to the public, and their visual observations were physically 
nonintrusive. Id. Since the defendant’s expectation of privacy was unreasonable and the 
officers’ activities did not constitute a trespass, no search occurred. Id.
Here, the officers and canine only used the public throughway in conducting their 
investigation. (J.A. 35.) Although Respondent may have manifested a subjective expectation to 
be free from wandering noses that might perceive the scent of his large scale growing operation, 
his expectation was unreasonable because these scents were free and open to the public. See 
Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 63 (Polston, J., dissenting). It would be unreasonable to assume that a
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dog would never enter one’s unenclosed porch to snitYaround the area. Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 
63 (Polston, J., dissenting). It is equally unreasonable to assume that a police officer would not 
enter the front porch area, just as a mailman docs, to knock on the front door. See generally 
Oliver, 466 U.S.at 177. This area is open to the public and can be viewed or smelled by any 
member of the public. See id.
2. This court has held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for 
possession of contraband.
When a test for contraband is performed and reveals no other personal information 
besides the presence of the illegal drugs, a defendant cannot have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Jacobsen, 476 U.S. at 207. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,406 (2005), the 
defendant was stopped for speeding on a public highway. The arresting police officer radioed a 
second officer and his police canine. Id. The dog alerted positive for drugs in the vehicle after 
walking around the exterior of the car. Id. Upon searching the vehicle, the officers discovered 
marijuana in the trunk. Id. This Court “held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be 
deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals possession of contraband 
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’” Id. at 408. Since the canine only revealed the 
possession of contraband for which there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, there was no 
Fourth Amendment search, /d. at 416.
In Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111, a private shipping carrier detected a suspicious white 
powdery substance in a package that had been damaged. The carrier asked Drug Enforcement 
Agency officers to examine the package, and the officers tested for cocaine. Id. The Court 
applied the Katz test and deemed that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy, since “a 
chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not
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compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123. Thus, the test did 
not reveal any information about the substance except whether it was an illegal drug. Id.
Here, Respondent possessed twenty-five pounds of marijuana for distribution in a 
hydroponic laboratory in his domicile. (J.A. 112.) Officer Franky was brought to Respondent’s 
front porch only to detect if there were illegal substances. (J.A. 37.) Since the interest in 
contraband items does not constitute a legitimate interest in privacy, Respondent could not have 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his large-scale marijuana growing operation. See 
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 416.
3. The Florida Supreme Court erred in inferring that police action outside 
Respondent’s home impeded Respondent’s Privacy.
In its holding, the Florida Supreme Court applied the Katz test, but deemed that the 
potentially “overbearing and harassing conduct” of the police determined whether their action 
was reasonable. Jardines //, 73 So. 3d at 49. Using this logic, the court concluded that the 
canine sniff was a search. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida misinterprets the case law on this 
subject. As discussed in Ciraolo, a defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy may still be 
overruled by whether that expectation was reasonable. 476 U.S. at 214. In a concurring opinion 
in Jardines //, Justice Lewis of the Florida Supreme Court explained that the consideration of 
embarrassment and police action is a policy consideration that influences whether there is a 
reasonably expectation of privacy in an area outside the house. Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 61 
(Lewis, J., concurring). While it is true that this Court has taken the “degree of spectacle” into 
account in previous decisions, this Court was referring to the embarrassment suffered by a 
defendant if the police publicly removed his private items from his luggage. See Place, 462 U.S. 
at 698. In this case, no items were revealed from the domicile at all. (J.A. 36-37.) The canine 
alerted to narcotics, yet the alert in itself appears to be only a slight change in behavior to the
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untrained eye. (J.A. 50.) The canine was the only officer present on the porch itself, as 
Detective Pedraja and Detective Bartlett were standing behind the entryway to the porch. (J.A. 
50.) The officers were in front of the house for a total of fifteen minutes. (J.A. 50.) Not only 
was there no public spectacle in the situation at hand, but this consideration falls outside of the 
legal question of whether Respondent has a reasonable expectation of privacy on his front porch. 
Janlines //, 73 So. 3d at 61.
C. Because Canine Sniffs Are Sui Generis and Only Reveal Information About 
Contraband, They Arc Distinct from Thermal Imagers or Recording Peyices,.
This Court held that use of thermal imaging devices to determine heat levels inside a
house is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Kyllo, 533 U.S, at 39. Additionally, this Court
held that using recording devices in public or private areas to obtain information which could not
otherwise be discovered by police is a search. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358. In both Kyllo and KatZy
this Court emphasized that the tools used by police gathered extensive private information that
could not otherwise be obtained. 533 U.S. at 39; 389 U.S. at 355. Here, Olficer Franky did not
reveal any additional information about the inside of Respondent’s house, and thus Kyllo and
Katz should not control the case at hand. 533 U.S. at 39; 389 U.S. at 355. {See J.A. 37.)
1. Canine sniffs are distinct from thermal imagers and do not intrude on
private information, so should not be scrutinized under the Kyllo standard.
The case at hand is distinct from this Court’s ruling in Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27. In Kyllo, 
police used a technologically-sophisticated thermal imaging device to detect whether large 
amounts of heat were being produced from lamps used to grow marijuana hydroponically. Id. at 
29, 30. In determining that the thermal imaging constituted a search, this Court reasoned that, 
“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home 
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
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protected area’ constitutes a search.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. The Court proposed that perhaps 
police could have inferred the time of day when the lady of the house took her shower based on 
the readings on the thermal imager. Id. at 38. Obtaining this sort of private information was 
considered both a violation of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy and a trespass since the 
imager obtained information from within the walls of the house beyond the simple presence of 
illegal marijuana growing operations. Id. at 38-39. This Court framed its decision in Kyllo in the 
context of considering “what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm 
of guaranteed privacy.” Id. at 34. This Court deemed that using sense-enhancing technology 
that is not in general public use to obtain information constitutes a search. Id.
Here, the police canine did not obtain information beyond the presence of marijuana 
somewhere in the residence. (^eeJ.A. 13,50.) The sniff only communicated information about 
the presence of narcotics, and the dog was not capable of alerting the officers to private 
information about Respondent merely by sniffmg. (^eeJ.A. 13.) The canine did not intrude 
upon the interior of the domicile, nor did it have any ability to communicate to officers any other 
information it may have perceived about the house and its surroundings. {See J.A. 13.) This 
Court in Kyllo imagined that future surveillance technology would need to be considered under 
the Fourth Amendment and used such consideration in its holding. 533 U.S. at 34. Here, the 
same logic does not apply because canine dogs have been used in formal police action in 
England since 1910 and in the United States since the 1950s. R.L. Block, Benefits of Canine 
Squads, Vol. 7.2 Journal of Police Science and Administration 155, 156 (June 1979). A canine 
is not a tool but an animal that can be trained to be sensitive to particular smells, just like a 
human can be trained to excel in particular skills such as computer programming or mathematics. 
Evidence of dogs bred to aid humans in hunting expeditions dates back to the time of King
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Tutankhamen in the thirteenth century before the common era. R.L. Block, supra, at 156. This 
is hardly new “technology,” and the prevalence of dogs trained and bred to track particular 
smells to assist in hunting indicates that their noses are not under the exclusive purvey of the 
United States police force. See id. Since Officer Franky is not new technology and canine 
smelling capabilities are available to the public at large, the facts of this case distinguish it from 
the facts in Kyllo, and this Court should not apply Kyllo to the case at hand.
2. Canine sniffs are distinct from recording devices in telephone booths 
because the canine only tells officials if narcotics are present.
This Court established its reasonable expectation of privacy test in Katz. 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, the defendant was arrested for illegal gambling after Federal 
Bureau of Investigation officers placed an electronic listening and recording device outside a 
phone booth that the defendant used to place illegal bets. Id. at 348. This Court that held the 
formerly-used trespass doctrine was an insufficient test in determining when a government 
search has occurred because new technologies allowed police to learn sensitive information 
without an invasion of the defendant’s physical property. Id at 353. The Court held that the 
recording devices, “violated the privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied while using 
the telephone booth.” Id. Although the phone booth was in a public setting, the defendant 
expected privacy while on his phone call, which the government’s listening device intruded 
upon. Id.
The case at hand is distinct because Respondent had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his home while growing illegal drugs, and even if he did, that privacy was not violated. If 
police had placed a listening device by the door, they may have obtained information that 
otherwise would have been assumed to be private. However, smells disseminating from a house 
cannot be considered private when a human or dog could perceive them from outside of the
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domicile. See Angelos, 433 F.3d at 747. As stated, the dog cannot obtain further infonnation 
from the house other than the presence of narcotics.
3. Canine sniffs are an essential and widely used method of combating the 
trafficking of marijuana, and considering them a search would hinder 
police efforts.
The Florida Attorney General’s Office reports that marijuana is the second largest cash 
crop in the state, after the citrus industry, from outdoor and indoor grow houses combined. An 
Analysis of Florida's Drug Control Efforts: Third Interim Report of the Fifteenth Statewide 
Grand Jury Before the Supreme Court of Florida, December 14,2000. A 2000 grand jury report 
made a recommendation “to increase State appropriations to the Guard for their anti-drug efforts, 
including the purchase and use of thennal imaging technology on aircraft surveillance to assist in 
the detection of marijuana ‘grow-houses.’” Id. The problem is so prevalent in the State of 
Florida that the Legislature was called upon to invest more funding in tools to assist in locating 
grow house and outdoor marijuana operations. Id. In 2007, 1,002 marijuana grow houses were 
discovered by law enforcement in Florida alone, often containing plants with almost double the 
tetrahydrocannabinol -- the active chemical in marijuana -- present in marijuana plants grown 
outdoors. Carmen Gentile, Florida's Marijuana Boom: House-Grown, and Potent, Time U.S., 
July 30, 2009, available at http://www.time.eom/time/nation/article/0,8599,1913401,00.
html#ixzz26Dtl AkP5.
Canines are one of several methods for police to combat the prevalence of marijuana; 
others include using thermal imaging devices and planes, both methods that have been 
challenged before this Court. Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of 
the Narcotics Detention Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405,432 (Winter 1996-1997). “The use of dogs to 
supplement police strength dales back to the early 1300s.” R L. Block, supra, at 156. Formally,
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police canines were introduced into cities in the United States shortly after World War II 
following an increase in crime and shortage of police officers. R.L. Block, supra, at 156.
Canines were used for a variety of reasons, but primarily as customs assistants to check incoming 
cargo. Id. Not only is the canine selected for particular skills as a drug detection dog, but the 
canine handler is also carefully selected and trained. Id. at 159. According to Mr. Bird, “Canine 
alerts have resulted in countless seizures of illegal narcotics. Without them, fighting the tide of 
narcotics trafficking would be significantly more difficult.” Bird, supra. See also Block, supra. 
This Court should consider the value of using well-trained drug detection canines in identifying 
marijuana grow houses.
II. IF DETECTIVE PEDRAJA’S CURSORY INSPECTION IS A SEARCH, THEN
REASONABLE SUSPICION IS THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD BY WHICH TO
DETERMINE ITS LEGALITY.
Detective Pedraja’s cursory inspection of the building at 13005 SW 257 Terrace using 
canine sniffing was not a search. If this Court determines that the detective’s activities did 
constitute a search, this Court should adopt the approach articulated by Justice Blackmun that “a 
dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be justified in this situation 
under Terry upon mere reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 723 (1983) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Reasonable suspicion is the appropriate evidentiary standard to use 
as an exception to the rule of probable cause because it is commensurate with the minimally 
intrusive methods used in this case: a canine sniff outside a building that revealed nothing about 
legal activities inside the building.
A. Individuals Have No Constitutional Protection fi’om Reasonable Search and 
Seizure.
The United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated ...U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Court’s determination of whether a search is 
reasonable or unreasonable is detennined by the factual context surrounding the alleged search. 
Terry V. OA/o, 392 U.S. 1,9(1968). “It must always be remembered that what the Constitution 
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.” Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 {I960) (emphasis added). Thus, the United States Constitution 
and this Court’s decisions that interpret it dictate that reasonableness is the arbiter of whether a 
search or seizure has subjected a person to an illegal government action, as judged by the facts ot 
the particular case.
Adams v, Williams involved a situation in which this Court has applied a standard less 
than probable cause to a police search. 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972). This Court asserted that 
“[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of 
information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a 
crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Id. In Adams, a police officer acted on a credible tip by 
approaching the suspect and taking a concealed weapon from the exact place in the suspect s 
clothing where the informant had said the weapon would be located. Id. at 145. .The Court 
upheld this search as valid, noting that the officer’s brief search of the suspect “may be most 
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” Id. at 146.
B. The Court Has a Preference that Searches Be Based on Probable Cause, Though It 
Applies a Lower Standard in Many Situations.
This Court has determined that probable cause is the standard to which searches must 
adhere, as a general rule. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973). The 
amount of evidence that satisfies the probable cause standard is “evidence which would ‘warrant 
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a [crime] has been committed ....” Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471,479 (1963) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,162
21
(1925)). Thus, in most cases, it is the rule of this Court that a search warrant be issued upon a 
showing of probable cause, which is satisfied by evidence that would lead a reasonable person to 
believe criminal activity is occurring.
1. The Supreme Court of the United States has identified searches to which it 
applies a standard lower than probable cause.
Though probable cause is the general rule, this Court has determined that the rule has
exceptions. Indeed, ‘“probable cause’ is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. The
fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be
reasonable ...New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (emphasis added). This Court
recognizes reasonableness, not only by showing probable cause, but also “by balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails.” Camara v. Mm. Court ofS.F., 387 U.S.
523, 536-37 (1967). Two key decisions from this Court illuminate the standard that applies to
investigations for which probable cause is overly restrictive: Terry and T.L.O.
First, in Terry, this Court recognized a category of searches that satisfy the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement not by a showing of probable cause, but by showing
reasonable suspicion:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot... he is 
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully 
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover 
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31. While observing the suspect for several minutes on a beat the 
officer had patrolled for thirty years, the officer in Terry noted specific suspicious 
behaviors from which he inferred that the suspect was armed in preparation for a robbery.
Id. at 28. The officer subsequently stopped the suspect and patted him down for 
weapons, finding a revolver. Id. at 29. The officer’s search actions were limited to
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finding the contraband gun and were not a full-scale search. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The
Court reasoned that the Constitution allows “a reasonable search for weapons for the
protection of the police officer ... regardless of whether [the officer] has probable cause
to arrest the individual for a crime.” Id. at 27.
The Terry opinion applied to a public safety stop for weapons, but is not limited
to a narrow construction. It is important to note that the Terry Court explicitly
recognized a legitimate governmental interest in investigatory searches that lead to crime
detection. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. The Court explained that the balancing of interests
underpirming its application of a standard less than probable cause includes crime
detection: “One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and
detection.” Id. Thus, Terry is instructive also for cases that deal with crime detection
more broadly, such as the detection of contraband narcotics in the current case.
Second, in T.L.O, this Court relied upon the balancing test approach and applied it to
searches of public school students on campus:
[Tjhe accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in 
the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be 
based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is 
violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend 
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.
T. L. O., 469 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added). T.L.O. was a public high school student
caught smoking, which was against school rules, in a school restroom by a teacher. Id. at
328. When Assistant Vice Principal Choplick questioned T.L.O. after the teacher’s
report, T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking and Mr. Choplick then searched her
purse for cigarettes. Id. This Court concluded that Mr. Choplick had a reasonable
suspicion, not just a vague hunch, that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse since a teacher
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had previously reported that the she had been smoking on campus. T. L O., 469 U.S. at 
345-46. This Court upheld the legality of the search on grounds of reasonable suspicion, 
asserting that Mr. Choplick had made a reasonable “sort of‘common-sense [conclusion] 
about human behavior’ upon which ‘practical people — including government officials — 
are entitled to rely.” Id. at 346 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981)).
2. Minimally intrusive inspections are an exception to the probable cause 
rule.
Since Terry and T.L.O., this Court has applied a balancing test to determine when a 
standard lower than probable cause should apply to a search, and has recognized a number of 
different situations where the public interest in safety or justice outweighs an individual’s 
privacy interests. The common thread among these cases is their rationale. The primary 
rationale this Court has used to uphold police inspections on less than probable cause is that the 
police action is “so substantially less intrusive ... that the general rule requiring probable cause 
to make Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test.” 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979). Contexts other than Terry and T.L.O. in which 
the limited nature of the intrusion merits a standard lower than probable cause include: a 
governmental employer’s search of an employee on matters related to employment, {O’Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)), the search of a probationer’s home, {Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868 (1987)), housing inspections, {Camara, 387 U.S. 523), a search of business premises in 
a heavily regulated industry, {New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)), inspection of an 
underground mine, {Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981)), prison inmates being subject to 
body-cavity searches, {Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979)), border patrol stops at an 
international border, {United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-81 (1975)), search of 
firearms-related businesses that are regulated by federal statute, {United States v. Biswell, 406
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U.S. 311,316 (1972)), and quick searches for weapons, {Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). As this panoply 
of cases clarifies, this Court already permits searches under an evidentiary standard lower than 
probable cause in many different contexts, including contexts that have nothing to do with guns, 
where the inspection is so minimally intrusive that the public interest in conducting the search 
clearly outweighs the individual’s privacy.
3. A canine sniff is a minimally intrusive investigation that should be subject 
to the reasonable suspicion evidentiary standard.
“The brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an 
important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be Justifiable 
on reasonable suspicion.” Place, 462 U.S. at 709. Canine sniffing is distinguished from other 
investigative techniques because it permits the quick identification of illegal material inside a 
closed container that does not have to be opened to reveal its legal contents. Kenneth L. Pollack, 
Stretching the Terry Doctrine to the Search for Evidence of Crime: Canine Sniffs, State 
Constitutions, and the Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 803, 805 (April, 1994). 
Because it is less invasive, it is less protected than a more thorough search. Id. at 805-06. Thus, 
because canine sniffs are minimally invasive and similar to the type of intrusion identified by 
this Court in many other reasonable suspicion cases, the balancing test analysis developed by this 
Court in Terry and T.L.O. should also apply to canine sniffs. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9; TL.O., 
469 U.S. 325.
Applying the Place criteria that brief, minimally intrusive investigations only require 
reasonable suspicion to be legal, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that canine sniffs are an exception to 
the general probable cause rule. United States v. Co/yer, 878 F.2d 469,477 (1989). InColyer, 
the canine sniff did “‘not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from 
view,’ and was not conducted in a manner or location that subjected appellant ‘to the
embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative 
methods . ..Colyer, 878 F.2d at 477 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 709). Just as in the present 
case, the Colyer court’s primary conclusion was that the canine sniff was not a search, but that, 
in the alternative, it would be a minimally intrusive investigation subject to reasonable suspicion. 
W. at 483.
Appellate courts have already determined that reasonable suspicion is the applicable 
standard for canine sniffs outside a residence, such as the one in the present case, in at least three 
states. The Court of Appeals of New York decided that a canine sniff “may be used without a 
warrant or probable cause, provided that the police have a reasonable suspicion that a residence 
contains ... contraband.” People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990). The Court of 
Appeals of Indiana ruled that “reasonable suspicion is needed to conduct a canine sniff of a 
private residence.” Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). According to the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska, “The investigative tool of the canine sniff at the threshold of a 
dwelling may be used where it is preceded by information amounting to reasonable, articulable 
suspicion.” State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. 1999). Though not binding on this Court, 
these decisions demonstrate a trend among the states that should inform this federal decision.
Though Dunn, Hoop, and Ortiz governed canine sniffs outside a residence, appellate 
courts in many other states have determined that canine sniffs are subject to reasonable suspicion 
in additional situations. For example, the Alaska Court of Appeals has found that “officers only 
needed reasonable suspicion to use a reliable canine to conduct a canine sniff of [a] warehouse 
exterior which was accessible to the public.” McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 511 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1991). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that “[a] narcotics detection canine may be 
deployed to test for the presence of narcotics [in the area outside a storage unit] where: 1. the
police are able to articulate reasonable grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the 
place they seek to test; and 2. the police are lawtully present in the place where the canine sniff is 
conducted.” Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 79 {Pa. 1987). The Minnesota Supreme 
Court adopted the same rule as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: “[WJe are persuaded by the 
reasoning of other courts and legal scholars that the standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion 
should also be considered in the process of balancing a person's privacy interests against the 
public’s interest in effective criminal investigations.” State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 211-12 
(Minn. 2005). Thus, the weight of state cases concerning canine sniffs, both outside a residence 
and at other locations, is in favor of a reasonable suspicions standard.
C. It Is Good Public Policy To Recognize Canine Sniffs as Within the Zone of 
Reasonable Suspicion Already Carved Out bv This Court.
After a thorough review of the cases relating to canine sniffs of contraband at or near a 
person’s home, “[t]he question of whether the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless canine 
sniff of an individual's home seems all but resolved in favor of permitting the technique.” 
Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, 41 U. Mem. L. Rev. 299, 324 (Winter, 2010). This trend towards permitting canine 
sniffs promotes good public policy and avoids the negative policy outcomes associated with 
affirming the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Respondent’s favor.
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of requiring probable cause for investigatory canine 
sniffs is that it burdens law enforcement in gathering information needed to protect the public, 
even though the police are using the least invasive method possible. “The greater suspicion 
required for probable cause increases the investment of police time and resources.” Pollack, 
supra, at 808. Since police time and resources are directly supported by taxpayer dollars, it is in 
the public’s interest to keep law enforcement free of expensive trappings that are not necessary
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for protecting public safety. Canine sniffing is a minimally invasive tool that allows for efficient 
crime detection without unnecessarily burdening the public resources invested in law 
enforcement.
Comparing the law on searches to that on seizures, this Court has recognized stops as a 
kind of seizure subject to a lower evidentiary standard than arrests, which can only be made with 
probable cause. Pollack, supra, at 839-40. Distinguishing the less intrusive stop from the more 
intrusive arrest recognizes that law enforcement needs the flexibility to deal with situations along 
a gradient of suspicion where all cases are not the same. The lack of such a gradient for 
searches, the sister of seizures under the Fourth Amendment, is inconsistent with the Court’s 
analysis of seizures. It also fails to meet the needs of law enforcement at the ground level to 
adequately protect public safety. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209.
By reversing the Florida Supreme Court, this Court would create greater certainty for 
both law enforcement and the public. This Court’s clarification on the canine sniffing issue will 
give law enforcement the confidence to use this minimally intrusive investigatory techmque 
appropriately and legally. The certainty will also help the public be secure in its right against 
unreasonable government intrusion. The articulation of a clear regime to govern the use of 
minimally invasive search techniques thus protects both the public and law enforcement and 
further undergirds the rule of law. Pollack, supra, at 839-40.
Applying a balancing test to determine reasonableness would allow courts to make 
deliberate choices between the competing interests of government and private individuals on a 
case-by-case basis. This would be an improvement over the homogenous use of the probable 
cause standard, which can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. It would increase the judiciary’s ability 
to review the bases for searches in particular circumstances and help ensure that police practices
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are well-balanced with the privacy rights of the public. Silas J. Wasserstrom and Louis Michael 
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L. J. 19, 46-47 (October, 
1988).
D. Frankv’s Alert to Narcotics Outside Respondent’s House Is a Minimally Invasive 
Inspection Within the Area This Court Has Carved Out for Reasonable Suspicion.
The canine sniff in question is significantly less intrusive than the Court-approved 
exceptions to the probable cause rule. For example, the investigation in Brignoni-Ponce 
involved the actual physical detention of a person, albeit for a very short time. 422 U.S. at 880.
In that case, the United States Border Patrol stopped an automobile in southern California on 
suspicion that its passengers were undocumented aliens. Id. at 874-75. The officers pursued the 
car, stopped it, and questioned the driver and two passengers. Id. at 875. The investigation 
lasted long enough for the officers to learn that the passengers had entered the country illegally. 
Id.
The facts of this case are distinguished from those in Brignoni-Ponce because Officer 
Pedraja had no contact with Respondent during the canine sniff activity. See 422 U.S. at 880, 
(J.A. 37.) In fact. Officer Franky never learned an34hing about Respondent other than his 
possession of contraband, in which an individual cannot have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. (J.A. 49-55). 543 U.S. at 408. Only the air outside the house m a non-
enclosed, publicly-accessibly part of the property was inspected. (J.A. 49, 58.) The sniff did not 
subject Respondent to a more intrusive search that would be less discriminatory in what was 
revealed. (J.A. 49-54.) The facts of this canine sniff are also analogous to the legal canine sniff 
in Colyer, discussed above, in being minimally intrusive. Colyer, 878 F.2d at 477.
Because this cursory inspection was much less intrusive than investigations this Court has 
already authorized on a reasonable suspicion basis, it falls within the space already carved out by
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this Court and does not represent an expansion of the use of a reasonable suspicion exception. 
See Terry, 392 U.S. I; T.LO., 469 U.S. 325; Ortega, 480 U.S. 709; Griffin, 483 U.S. 868; 
Camara, 387 U.S. 523; Burger, 482 U.S. 691; Donovan, 452 U.S. 594; Bell, 441 U.S. 520; 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873; Biswell, 406 U.S. 311. It is the uniquely minimally invasive 
nature of Franky’s sniff outside Respondent’s home that qualities this case to be judged 
according to the Terry balancing test and held to a reasonable suspicion standard of evidence.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
E. Detective Pedraia’s Reliance on Canine Sniffing Satisfied the Reasonable 
Suspicion Standard.
Since reasonable suspicion is the evidentiary standard that should be used to judge the 
legality of the canine sniff outside Respondent’s front door, this Court must additionally decide 
whether Officer Pedraja satisfied the standard when he invited Officer Franky to approach the 
residence’s front door. As the record shows and as discussed below, Officer Pedraja met that 
standard through reliance on articulable facts, including a reliable Crime Stoppers tip, that 
justified his suspicion.
I. An officer must base reasonable suspicion on articulable facts, including 
anonymous tips that are reliable.
“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added). In Terry, police officer 
McFadden observed the appellant from afar in a neighborhood the officer had patrolled for thirty 
years. Id. at 5-6. He saw the appellant pace back in front of a store several times, stopping each 
time to look in the window. Id. at 6. He saw the appellant talk with another person who was 
pacing the same path. Id. Because the officer could articulate specific facts from his
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observations — much more than subjective hunches -- along with rational inferences based on his 
experience, this Court upheld the officer’s search of the appellant based on reasonable suspicion. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27-28.
Anonymous tips, in addition to a police officer’s general observations, can form part of 
an officer’s suspicion. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000). To do so, an anonymous tip 
should have indicia of reliability sufficient to override the general presumption, which is that 
“[ajnonymous tips ... are generally less reliable than lips from known informants and can form 
the basis for reasonable suspicion only if accompanied by specific indicia of reliability ....” Id. 
\x\.J.L., the police received an anonymous call that lacked any indication of credibility. Id. at 
271. The Court specified that “[t]he reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be 
reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” Id. 
at 272.
Furthermore, drug trafficking is a particularly dangerous offense to combat, and officers 
must rely on tips for assistance. Officers attest to the risk they encounter when investigating 
grow houses since drug traffickers typically try to protect their crop - thus their profits - by 
storing firearms inside houses used as hydroponics labs. News, South Florida High Intensity 
Drug Trafficking Area (Oct. 5, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.sflhidta.org/news.html. Tips from 
informants help protect law enforcement from drug-related violence and help them target their 
efforts by giving them insider information about dangerous illicit activity. For example, in 
Florida, “Miami Police Major Charles Nanney says informants played a crucial role in the 
success of a statewide crackdown in June [2009] that resulted in the seizure of 6,828 marijuana 
plants and 120 residential marijuana labs over the course of a few days.” Gentile, supra.
Without the additional reliability provided by tips to crime detection hotlines such as Crime
Stoppers, police face uniiecessaiy exposure to the risk of drug-related violence.
2. Detective Pedraja had articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable 
suspicion that there was marijuana inside the building.
The anonymous tip that Detective Pedraja investigated contained sufficient indicia of 
credibility. It was predictive not just with respect to the location of the grow house but also with 
respect to what would be found inside: contraband marijuana. (See J.A. 8.) With the window 
shades of the house drawn, the caller could not have known what was inside without being privy 
to some variety of insider information.
Detective Pedraja’s suspicion was based on more than a vague hunch. He suspected 
criminal activity at the residence because of the cumulative weight of the Crime Stoppers tip that 
alleged marijuana growing, his observations that all window blinds were closed and that no cars 
were in the driveway, hearing a continuously-running air conditioner, and smelling live 
marijuana plants. (J.A. 8, 36-37, 109.) “Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as 
such, practical people formulated certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior; 
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same -- and so are law enforcement officers.
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418. The Court permits law enforcement to draw commonsense conclusions, 
which is exactly what Detective Pedraja did. Due to the Crime Stoppers tip and his own 
observations, he concluded that there was marijuana inside the house. (J.A. 8-9.) Thus, 
Detective Pedraja acted with a reasonable suspicion when he invited Franky and Detective 
Bartelt onto the publicly-accessible porch of the house to confirm his suspicion.
F. The Evidence Against Respondent Qualifies for the Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule.
Applying the probable cause evidentiary standard to this case would work against the 
public interest and thwart the administration of justice. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
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922 (1984). Even if the Court decides that this cursory inspection was a search subject to a 
probable cause standard that was not satisfied by Detective Pedraja, it should allow the evidence 
in question to be used against Respondent under the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule. In Leoriy this Court created an exception to the exclusionary rule where an officer 
reasonably and in good faith relies on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. 468 U.S. 
at 922-23. Permitting evidence obtained in good faith to be admitted protects the public from 
people like Respondent who threaten the public wellbeing by flouting this country’s drug laws. 
As the Court said in Leon, “[w]e conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by 
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated 
search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. at 922.
Here, Detective Pedraja acted in good faith. Detective Pedraja had previously written 
affidavits for search warrants similar to the one he wrote in this case. (J.A. 132.) Those were 
signed and granted by judges, just like the search warrant granted in this instance. (J.A. 132.) 
Additionally, the trial court hearing this case had previously issued a search warrant, which was 
upheld by the Third District Court of Appeal when challenged, based on observations identical to 
those in this case: an officer smelled the odor of marijuana, the shades of a residence were 
closed, and an air conditioning unit was running without shutting off (J.A. 119, 120.) Thus, 
Detective Pedraja’s good faith was supported by his past experience of having similar search 
warrants granted by a judge under similar circumstances.
The public safety cost of excluding the evidence of twenty-five pounds of marijuana 
found inside the residence and exempting Respondent from responsibility is too high for this 
Court to accept. Through his lawless actions operating a marijuana hydroponics lab, Respondent 
put the public at risk of illegal narcotics activity and its concomitant violence. There is little
benefit in excluding the evidence since Detective Pedraja acted objectively and in good faith.
The evidence should be admitted and the Supreme Court of Florida should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Canine sniffs are not searches under the Fourth Amendment and thus should not be 
subject to a probable cause evidentiary standard. This Court has held that canine sniffs of 
luggage and cars do not violate the Fourth Amendment because the canines are in publicly 
accessible places and the procedure does not reveal a defendant’s personal information. 
Additionally, this Court has held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
contraband. Here, Respondent had no reasonable expectation of privacy on his porch and could 
not have an expectation of privacy in his marijuana growing operation. Since the canine sniff 
did not reveal any private information about Respondent beyond his ownership of illegal 
substances, the canine sniff should not be considered a search.
Should this Court find that the canine sniff on Respondent’s property is a search, a 
reasonable suspicion standard should be applied. This Court has indicated its willingness to 
apply a standard lower than probable cause to minimally invasive investigations where public 
interests outweigh the privacy interests intruded upon. In these cases, courts apply the 
reasonable suspicion standard and not probable cause. Canine sniffs are minimally intrusive, and 
thus should fall within the reasonable suspicion standard. Additionally, the public benefit of 
eliminating marijuana grow houses and the officers’ need to proceed with caution when 
approaching growing houses outweigh Respondent’s interest in privacy for contraband. For the 
forgoing reasons. Petitioner requests that this Court REVERSE the Supreme Court of Florida and 
REMAND this case with direction that this canine sniff does not qualify as a search under the
Fourth Amendment or, in the alternative that it is a search, that its legality be assessed under the 
reasonable suspicion standard.
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